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is used to study how trade liberalization affects ﬁrms’ choices through both product and factor markets.
Trade liberalization is shown to always redistribute capital toward more efﬁcient ﬁrms and always to
improve an industry’s total factor productivity. However, it may reduce capital prices and cause labor
productivitytodrop. Lowefﬁciencyﬁrmsareaffectedmainlybychanges inthefactormarket, whilehigh
efﬁciency ﬁrms are affected mainly by changes in the product market. In response to trade liberalization,
low efﬁciency ﬁrms always reduce their product scope, but high efﬁciency ﬁrms may expand their scope.
The model demonstrates the importance of the interplay between product and factor markets.
Keywords: ﬁrm heterogeneity, trade liberalization, multiproduct, multifactor, ﬁrm structure, scale,
scope, mergers and acquisitions
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11 Introduction
Recent studies of international trade have focused on how trade liberalization improves overall efﬁciency
by redistributing resources across heterogenous ﬁrms.1 These studies have shown that international trade
exerts its impacts through intensiﬁed competition in the factor market or in the product market. In his
seminal paper, Melitz (2003) demonstrated how, by bidding up the wage rate, trade liberalization forces the
least efﬁcient ﬁrms to quit. The intensiﬁed competition in the product market, however, does not play any
role, as a CES preference was used.2 This is changed in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), who used a linear
demand function and showed that exit of the least efﬁcient ﬁrms was caused by tougher competition in the
product market. But in that model, the factor market was dormant because the wage rate was assumed to be
ﬁxed.
In this research, we studied the joint impacts of intensiﬁed competition in both the product and factor
markets. New results and new forces emerge when both markets are at work. In particular, we found that
intensiﬁed competition in the product market may reduce the factor price, and substitution between factors
may cause labor productivity to drop. Firms respond to changes in the product and factor markets in a non-
uniform way: less efﬁcient ﬁrms are affected mainly by changes in the factor market, while more efﬁcient
ﬁrms are affected mainly by changesin the product market. Inresponseto trade liberalization, lowefﬁciency
ﬁrms always shrink the scope of their products, but high efﬁciency ﬁrms may expand it.
In our model, heterogeneous ﬁrms produce differentiated products using two inputs, labor and capital.
While labor is readily available at an exogenous wage rate, industry-speciﬁc capital is in ﬁxed supply and
the capital price is endogenized. Demand is linear al aMelitz and Ottaviano (2008), so competition in
the product market also affects ﬁrms’ choices. Firms play a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, they trade
capital in a perfectly competitive acquisition market before allocating capital to the production of multiple
products. Each ﬁrm chooses the number of products (i.e., its scope) and the amount of capital applied to
each product (i.e., the scale). In the second stage, all products compete monopolistically in the product
market. Each ﬁrm’s structure (i.e., scope and scale) and the distribution of inputs and outputs across ﬁrms
will be determined by the tradeoff between the product and acquisition markets.
We start with two identical countries originally in autarky due to, say, prohibitively high trade costs. A
shock then completely wipes out all the trade costs. This trade liberalization affects the acquisition market
both directly, and indirectly through the product market. The exporting opportunity induces ﬁrms to produce
more, pushing up the aggregate demand for capital. This is the direct effect. The increased competition
in each country’s product market reduces demand for each product, depressing the aggregate demand for
capital. This is the indirect effect. We have shown that the relative strength of the two effects depends
crucially on the substitutability between products. When the products are close substitutes, the reduction in
product demand can be so great that the indirect effect dominates, in which case the capital price will drop
as a result of trade liberalization.
1See the survey by Helpman (2006).
2“In the isoelastic case, the demand level has no effect on the cutoff because any shift in demand is offset by entry, in contrast
to the case of linear demand.” (Helpman, 2006, p.603)
2For individual ﬁrms, trade liberalization brings exporting opportunities as well as the challenges of in-
tensiﬁed product competition. Although all ﬁrms face the same opportunities and challenges, they respond
differently. Low efﬁciency ﬁrms can make only small proﬁts from each product; having exporting oppor-
tunity will not add much. They are affected mainly by the intensiﬁed competition, so they sell capital and
reduce their scope and scale. High efﬁciency ﬁrms, in contrast, are more capable of making use of the ex-
porting opportunity; they buy capital and expand their scope and/or scale. Capital moves from low to high
efﬁciency ﬁrms.
Along with capital, labor will alsoﬂow toward more efﬁcient ﬁrms. Theredistribution improvesindustry
total factor productivity as measured by the joint contribution of labor and capital. For labor productivity,
however, there is an extra effect due to the substitution between the two inputs. Since both inputs are
optimally chosen by each ﬁrm and all ﬁrms face the same wage rate and capital price, they all choose the
same labor/capital ratio. The ratio will be affected by trade liberalization, which changes the capital price
but not the wage rate. When capital becomes more expensive, ﬁrms will substitute labor for capital, more
labor will be employed, and labor productivity at the ﬁrm level will drop. Such a substitution effect (within
each ﬁrm) is distinct from the resource reallocation effect (across ﬁrms), so even when ﬁrm-level labor
productivity drops, industry-level labor productivity may still improve.
This analysis clariﬁes the fundamental tradeoff that shapes ﬁrms’ choices. In models where the impact
of trade liberalization is through the factor market, the tradeoff is between product proﬁts and various ﬁxed
costs (Melitz, 2003). In models where the impact is through increased competition in the product market,
the tradeoff is between product proﬁts and variable costs (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). In both cases,
trade liberalization has a uniform impact on ﬁrms (i.e., ﬁrms’ product market proﬁts all move in the same
direction), andalladjustmentstakeplaceatthemargin: Themarginalexportersexpand, reducingtheproduct
demand or pushing up the factor price, which in turn forces the marginal producers to quit.3 In our model,
both product and factor markets are at work, and the fundamental tradeoff faced by heterogeneous ﬁrms
is better viewed as the one between products and resources.4 Firms differ in their efﬁciency in turning
resources into products. While a resource is equally costly to all, it generates different revenues in the
product market depending on a ﬁrm’s efﬁciency. Trade liberalization brings shocks to both markets and
changes the tradeoff between products and resources. Further, the change depends on a ﬁrm’s efﬁciency,
leading to non-uniform responses to trade liberalization.
While the study of heterogeneous ﬁrms started with single product ﬁrms, attention has recently turned
to multiproduct ﬁrms. According to Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005) and Bernard, Redding and Schott
3Given the constant marginal cost of production assumed in all the models, domestic sales and exports are independent and
additive activities governed by different ﬁxed or variable costs. Firms self select into different activities: those with the lowest
efﬁciencies exit; those with moderate efﬁciencies produce only for the domestic market; and those with the highest efﬁciencies
produce for both their domestic market and the export. When trade costs are lowered, exporting proﬁts increase, so more ﬁrms
export. This will intensify product competition or bid up the factor price. Because the marginal producers do not export, they bear
the burden of intensiﬁed competition in the product or factor market without reaping the beneﬁts of increased exporting proﬁts, so
they are forced to quit.
4Such a view is not in conﬂict with the two approaches taken in previous studies, as ﬁxed costs and variable costs are all costs
of resources needed in production. Between the two approaches, the one by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) is closer to ours because
of the linearity of demand and the absence of ﬁxed costs.
3(2008), only 41 percent of U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms produce more than a single product, but these ﬁrms
account for 91 percent of U.S. manufacturing output and 95 percent of U.S. exports. Theoretical modelling
of multiproduct ﬁrms extended heterogeneity to products within a ﬁrm. The basic force remains the same:
trade liberalization eliminates the marginal products, so all ﬁrms reduce scope uniformly (Bernard, Redding
and Schott, 2009; Eckel and Neary, 2009; Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano, 2009).5 In our model, products are
homogeneous within a ﬁrm, and the scope is proportional to each variety’s proﬁt s .W eh a v es h o w nt h a ta
ﬁrm’s choice of product scope in response to trade liberalization then depends on its efﬁciency.
Empirical studies of multiproduct ﬁrms have turned up mixed results about product scope. Although
Bernard, ReddingandSchott’s(2009)theorypredictsuniformreductioninscope, theirown(2008)empirical
investigation of U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms between 1987 and 1997 had different ﬁndings: High efﬁciency
ﬁrmsincreasedscopewhilelowefﬁciencyﬁrmsreducedscope, whichisconsistentwithourtheory. Baldwin
and Gu (2006) found that both exporters and non-exporters in Canada reduced product diversiﬁcation from
1973 to 1997, but the reduction does not seem to have been related to tariff cuts, even though Canada
underwent two rounds of trade liberalization during that period. Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) found that
Mexican ﬁrms invested in developing new products for export as a response to trade liberalization. Goldberg
et al (2009) found that Indian ﬁrms did not reduce their product scopes during the 1989-2003 period, which
included profound trade and other reforms.6 Our model shows the possibility of and the conditions for
expansions in scope after trade liberalization.
Capital trading was modeled explicitly in this study.7 Such trading enables ﬁrms to add or delete produc-
tion facilities, and thus can be regarded as a partial merger or acquisition. Mergers and acquisitions (M&As)
constitute a major method of industrial restructuring (UNCTAD, 2000) and are the quickest and least costly
way to respond to external shocks such as trade liberalization. Waves of mergers have been documented
as a consequence of trade liberalization and other such shocks (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). Breinlich
(2008) found that the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement of 1989 increased domestic Canadian
M&A activity by over 70%. Using data on Swedish ﬁrms for the period 1980-1996, Greenaway, Gullstrand
and Kneller (2008) have shown that intensiﬁed international competition induced M&As. Maksimovic and
Phillips (2001) contended that “industry shocks alter the value of the assets and create incentives for trans-
fers to more productive uses”, and they showed that productive assets tend to move from less efﬁcient to
more efﬁcient ﬁrms when an industry undergoes a positive demand shock. Our analysis has now provided a
theoretical explanation for these empirical ﬁndings.
We will ﬁrst present the model and analyze the autarky equilibrium. The equilibrium after trade liber-
alization will then be found and compared with the autarky case. All the proofs are collected in Appendix
5BaldwinandGu(2006) reached the same reducedscope conclusion assuminghomogeneous products withineachﬁrm. Within-
ﬁrmhomogeneityhas also been assumed byNocke andYeaple (2006), whofurther assumedan exogenous tradeoff betweenproduct
scope and ﬁrm-level productivity. They predicted that trade liberalization would induce high efﬁciency ﬁrms to shrink their product
lines and low efﬁciency ﬁr m st oe x p a n dt h e m .
6Goldberg et al (2009) attributed the discrepancy between their ﬁndings and the predictions of prevailing theories to regulations
in India, which prevented the optimal allocation of resources.
7Spearot (2008) also allowed ﬁrms to trade capital, but assumed single-product ﬁrms and capital transactions in single unit. His
conclusion that only moderately efﬁcient ﬁr m sa c q u i r ec a p i t a li st h u sv e r yd ifferent from our predictions.
4I. Appendix II analyzes unilateral trade liberalization in which a country faces competition from imports of
differentiated products but is not allowed to export this industry’s products.
2A u t a r k y
2.1 Production and inputs
Consider a world with two identical countries, between which there initially is no trade due to prohibitively
high trade costs. In each country, consumption consists of a numeraire good and differentiated products
produced by a continuum of ﬁrms in an industry. From a uniform distribution on [0,1], each ﬁrm draws its
efﬁciency, ϕ, which is the only parameter that distinguishes ﬁrms.
A ﬁrm can produce multiple products by incurring a management cost, mv2,w h e r em>0 and v is the
number of varieties that the ﬁrm produces. Production of the numeraire good requires two units of labor
for one unit of output. Labor supply to this industry is perfectly elastic, so the wage rate, w, is equal to 1
2.





in which q is the output of the variety, x is its capital input and l is its labor input. In the short run, a plant’s
capital is ﬁxed, and thus its variable cost is minl(wl) subject to q =( ϕxl)
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Each ﬁrm is endowed with one unit of capital. With this endowment and knowing their efﬁciency levels,
ﬁrms play a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage (the acquisition stage), ﬁrms buy and sell capital in a perfectly
competitive acquisition market. If a ﬁrm sells all of its capital, it becomes inactive in the product market.
An inactive ﬁrm still keeps its ϕ and may choose to re-enter the product market later by buying capital in
the acquisition market. Entry or exit incurs no extra cost. After the capital trading, every active ﬁrm chooses
its number of varieties and the allocation of capital to each plant. A ﬁrm’s structure therefore consists of
its product scope (the number of varieties) and plant-level capital scale (the amount of capital used in each
plant). For expositional convenience, scale and scope will be treated as continuous variables. Capital is
assumed to be perfectly divisible, and there is no minimum capital requirement for running a plant. In the
second stage (the production stage), production is carried out and all varieties compete in a monopolistically
competitive product market.8
8We assume away any cannibalization producing one variety has on the proﬁtability of other varieties. Schwartz and Thompson
(1986) and also Baye, Crocker and Ju (1996) have shown that, in an effort to gain market share from competing companies or
forestall entry, many companies instruct their divisions to act as independent ﬁrms despite cannibalization. If this assumption
is relaxed to accommodate cannibalization, our major conclusions still hold. Feenstra and Ma (2008) have demonstrated that
5In this model, capital represents industry-speciﬁc physical assets that are needed in production. Unlike
ﬁnancial assets, after the initial trading round, capital must be acquired through acquisition or merger rather
than from ﬁnancial institutions. This implies that the supply of capital is perfectly inelastic at the industry
level. This is justiﬁed if the total amount of physical assets cannot quickly be increased, but the results still
hold evenifnewcapital canbegeneratedinresponsetoanincreaseinthecapital price. Assuming aperfectly
competitive acquisition market implies that capital is homogeneous and acquisitions can be partial. That is,
instead of acquiring a stand-alone target ﬁrm, the acquirer buys some productive assets from other ﬁrms
and uses them along with its own assets. Jovanovic and Rousseua (2002) have argued that transactions in
the used-capital market work just like those in a M&A market. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) report that
about half of U.S. M&A transactions are partial acquisitions or divestitures by multi-product conglomerates.
Consider ﬁrst the product market, then the acquisition market (also referred to as the factor market), and
ﬁnally the industry equilibrium.
2.2 The product market
Assume L identical consumers in each country. Each consumer has a quasi-linear preference (à la Melitz
and Ottaviano, 2008) for the numeraire good and all varieties in the industry:



















where α,β,γ > 0, Q0 is the consumption of the numeraire good, Ω is the set of all varieties, and qi is the
consumption of variety i. A consumer maximizes his utility subject to a budget constraint. As a result, the







Lqi.F o rag i v e nγ,w h e n
β is larger, other varieties’ outputs reduce the demand for variety i by a larger amount, meaning that the
substitution between varieties is stronger. Therefore, β measures substitutability between varieties: larger β
means stronger substitution.
In monopolistic competition, the seller of variety i regards itself as a monopolist, and the competition
between products is captured only in the vertical intercept of the demand function. In equilibrium, the
demand function for variety i is:







In this demand function, pi is the price of variety i, M is the measure of Ω,a n dP =
R
i∈Ω pidi is the
aggregate price of all varieties. The slope b is exogenous, but the intercept A is endogenous, depending
cannibalization would not change the major ﬁndings of Melitz (2003).
6on both the degree of product substitution (captured in β) and the degree of product market competition
(captured in the endogenous P and M).
Each ﬁrm takes A as given when choosing its output. If a ﬁrm with efﬁciency ϕ has amount xi of capital
in its plant to produce variety i, it chooses output qi to maximize its proﬁtf r o mt h i sv a r i e t y :
max
qi≥0
















Greater demand (i.e., a larger A) leads to more output, a higher price and more proﬁt for each variety. Since
a variety’s proﬁt, πi(xi), is increasing and concave in xi,aﬁrm will always allocate its total capital among
its varieties equally. Consequently, the subscript i can be dropped in (3).
2.3 The acquisition market
Let R be the market price of capital. If a ﬁrm chooses scope v and scale x, its capital cost is (vx − 1)R,
where vx − 1 is the ﬁrm’s net demand for capital, which can be negative (meaning that the ﬁrm is selling
capital). The ﬁrm’s optimization problem in the acquisition market is
max
x≥0,v ≥0
Π(v,x) ≡ vπ(x) − (vx− 1)R − mv2 = v˜ π(x)+R − mv2,
where ˜ π(x) ≡ π(x) − xR is the proﬁt of each single plant, taking into account the capital cost but not the





It is as if the ﬁrm ﬁrst sells its endowment of unit capital and then chooses how much capital to buy for each
of its plants. Since there is no transaction cost, selling and buying capital is fully reversible.
Given the above decomposition of the proﬁt function, a ﬁrm’s optimization problem can be solved in
two steps: The optimal scale is x∗ =a r g m a x x ˜ π(x), which is independent of the choice of v,a n dt h e
optimal scope is then v∗ =a r gm a x v Π(v,x∗).







The variable y reﬂects the connection between the product and factor markets. π(x) is proportional to A2
2 ,
so y2 = A2
2R reﬂects the value of capital (in the product market) relative to the cost of capital (in the factor
market).
The ﬁrst-order condition ∂˜ π










2ϕb for ϕ>ϕ 0,
(5)
where ϕ0 ≡ 1
y2. The second-order condition is always satisﬁed. It will later become clear that y>1 in
equilibrium and therefore ϕ0 < 1. Expression (5) says that very inefﬁcient ﬁrms will not operate in the
product market. When ϕ is small, a plant’s proﬁt from the product market will also be small, and the ﬁrm
will earn a better payoff by selling all its capital and discontinuing production.9 Note that the cutoff point
for exit, ϕ0, depends solely on y. When the product market is more proﬁtable relative to the capital price,
even a low efﬁciency ﬁrm will choose to operate, so more ﬁrms will be active in the product market. For
an active plant, the scale increases with y: When the product market becomes more proﬁtable relative to
the capital price, each plant will operate on a larger scale. This is because the marginal beneﬁt of capital is
proportional to A2
2 , while the marginal cost of acquiring capital is R.











> 0 for ϕ ∈ (ϕ0,4ϕ0),
< 0 for ϕ>4ϕ0.
Plant scale increases with a ﬁrm’s efﬁciency when the efﬁciency is low, but if 4ϕ0 < 1 (or equivalently,
y>2), the scale decreases with efﬁciency when the efﬁciency is sufﬁciently high, generating an inverse
U-shape. The reason is that when ϕ is small, each variety is sold at a high price, where demand is highly
elastic. Increasing x will bring a large beneﬁt. But when ϕ is large, each variety is already sold at a low
9In many formulations, least efﬁcient ﬁrms exit due to ﬁxed production costs (e.g., Melitz, 2003). Without ﬁxed costs, exit
happens with a linear demand function (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008), as the constant marginal costs that some ﬁrms draw turn out
to be larger than the intercept of the demand. In our model, demand is linear as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and there is no ﬁxed
production cost. A ﬁrm’s marginal cost can be arbitrary small (when its output is close to zero) even if it is very inefﬁcient. It will
always generate some proﬁt, however small, in the product market. A ﬁrm exits only because it can earn a better payoff by selling
its capital in the factor market. The tradeoff between product and factor markets is the driving force here.
8price, where the demand is barely elastic. Increasing x will not bring much beneﬁt. Note that the inverse U
relationship does not exist with CES preferences.
2.3.2 Product scope





ϕ0, which is strictly increasing in ϕ.G i v e n˜ π,t h eﬁrst-order condition for optimal scope ∂Π
∂v =˜ π−2mv =0










4ϕbm for ϕ>ϕ 0.
(6)
The second-order condition is always satisﬁed. Notice that
∂v
∂ϕ
> 0 for all ϕ>ϕ 0.
Thus, more-efﬁcient ﬁrms maintain larger scopes. The marginal beneﬁt from adding a variety is ˜ π,w h i l e
the marginal cost is 2vm. Since the marginal beneﬁt increases with ϕ, the optimal scope should be larger
when ϕ is higher.











The numerator relates a ﬁrm’s product scope to the product and acquisition markets, or more precisely to
the value of capital in the product market vis-a-vis the cost of capital in the acquisition market. The value
of capital is positively related to ϕ, while the cost of capital is independent of ϕ. Therefore, if there is any
change to the two markets due to, say, trade liberalization, ﬁrms will respond differently depending on their
efﬁciencies even though they face the same changes in A and R. In particular, high efﬁciency ﬁrms are
affected mainly by the value of capital and thus by changes in the product market, while low efﬁciency ﬁrms
are affected mainly by the cost of capital and thus by changes in the acquisition market.
92.3.3 Firm-level capital














> 0 for ϕ<16ϕ0,
< 0 for ϕ>16ϕ0.
Because scope increases with ϕ while scale is inverse U-shaped, ﬁrm capital is also inverse U-shaped with
efﬁciency. Note that the turning point for ﬁrm capital (at 16ϕ0) is larger than that for plant scale (at 4ϕ0).
In any case, the important message is that more efﬁcient ﬁrms do not necessarily require more capital. Also
note that the envelope theorem indicates that a ﬁrm’s proﬁt always increases with ϕ even if its capital scale
does not.
2.3.4 Outputs
























Both outputs increase with efﬁciency.
2.3.5 Productivity
Three measures of productivity will be calculated: labor productivity, total factor productivity (or TFP) of
labor and capital, and overall productivity that takes into consideration management costs.
Labor productivity is the ratio between output and labor input. At the plant level, labor input is l =
q2
ϕx.









Since all plants of a ﬁrm are identical, the ﬁrm-level labor productivity is the same. Capital price R matters
for labor productivity because it affects the relative price between labor and capital and thus the optimal
10combination of the two inputs in production.
In this model, both labor and capital are used in production, so we need a measure that relates outputs to
the two inputs. Given the production function at the plant level, q =
√









which is the same at both the plant and ﬁrm levels. Unlike labor productivity, TFP does not depend on
market conditions such as input prices, substitutability between products, or degree of competition. To the
extent that ﬁrm-level productivity should reﬂect technologies only and should be independent of changes in
market conditions, TFP is a more useful measure than labor productivity. Although ﬁxed at the ﬁrm level,
TFP at the industry level will change as labor and capital is redistributed among ﬁrms, thus providing a
measure of the impact of trade liberalization.
The two productivity measures deﬁned above ignore the management costs of maintaining multiple
products.10 To take that into consideration, deﬁne overall productivity as the reciprocal of average cost.






















The overall productivity increases with ϕ at both the plant and ﬁrm levels, and the difference between the
two reﬂects the impact of management cost.
To summarize:
Proposition 1. Given A and R, capital scale at both the plant and ﬁrm levels increases with a ﬁrm’s
efﬁciency ϕ when ϕ is small, but may decrease with ϕ when ϕ is large. Scope, output and productivity all
increase with ϕ.
Since a ﬁrm’s scope and each plant’s output are both increasing in ϕ, the two are positively correlated.
That is, intensive margins (i.e., each variety’s output) and extensive margins (i.e., the number of varieties)
are positively correlated, conﬁrming what Bernard, Redding and Schott (2009) have found.
10We view the management cost as a labor cost, but this labor is skilled labor, unlike the (unskilled) labor that is an input to
production. More speciﬁcally, v
2 can be viewed as the physical units of skilled labor needed to manage v varieties, and m is the
exogenous wage rate for skilled labor. Throughout this discussion, labor refers to unskilled labor.
11This is not an coincidence. Given the Cobb-Douglas production function, the expenditure on the two inputs will be equalized




Now to determine the equilibrium capital price R for a given A. Market clearing in the acquisition market
requirestotalcapitalsupplytoequalcapitaldemandattheindustrylevel. Sinceeachﬁrmisinitiallyendowed
with one unit of capital, the total capital supply in the industry is
Z 1
0







ρ, where ρ =2 y3 +3 y2(1 − 2lny) − 6y +1 .
Given A, it can be proved (see Appendix I) that there exists a unique equilibrium capital price R satis-





Note that this expression is not a reduced form solution for R,a sy is deﬁned on R.
2.4 Industry equilibrium







ψ, where ψ = y2 − 4y +3+2l ny. (9)






























, where φ = y3 − 2y2 − 2+3 y − 2ylny. (10)
12By the deﬁnition of A in (1): A =
αγ+βP








,( 1 1 )
where η = y3 −6y2 +2+3y +6ylny. The three equilibrium values A, R and y are jointly determined by
equations (4), (8) and (11). Use (8) and (11) in (4) to yield the following equation expressed in terms of y
only:








α2 .( 1 2 )
It can be shown that Z0(y) > 0, Z(1) < 0,a n dZ(y) > 0 when y is sufﬁciently large. Therefore, there
exists a unique y>1 satisfying (12). Once y is determined, R is determined from (8) and A is determined
from (4) or (11). As a result,
Proposition 2. A unique equilibrium A and R exist in autarky.
























































,w h e r e θ = y4 +1 2 y2(1 − lny) − 16y +3 .
133 Trade Liberalization: The Impacts of Imports and Exports
Now suppose that trade liberalization reduces all trade costs (ﬁxed and variable) to zero.12 Such a trade
liberalization gives producers in each country both the opportunity to export and the challenge of intensiﬁed
competition. We are interested in how ﬁrms respond to trade liberalization by adjusting their capital struc-
ture, and how productivity changes as a result of resource redistribution. Cross-border M&A is excluded.13
3.1 Equilibrium after trade liberalization











where the subscript t stands for trade. Variables in autarchy are denoted by subscript a. In what follows, we
will use fi to denote f(yi) for any given function f(y),w h e r ei = a,t.
Given At in each country, a ﬁrm chooses the quantity of each variety, qt, which is allocated equally to
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ϕb , if ϕ>ϕ 0
t.
(14)
The ﬁrm chooses its scope, vt, to maximize its total proﬁt vt˜ πt(xt) − mv2
t + Rt, yielding the following
12If trade costs are positive but small enough to allow for trade, the qualitative results will not change.
13Because the two countries are symmetrical, cross-border trading of capital will not happen even if it is allowed. Cross-border












2ϕbm , if ϕ>ϕ 0
t.
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2b2mρt. Market clearing in the acquisition
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Equations (16) and (17) and the deﬁnition of yt jointly determine the three unknowns At, Rt and yt as the
equilibrium after trade liberalization.
In fact, instead of going through these steps, there is an alternative and much simpler way to obtain the















This problem is identical to that in the autarky case, (2), except that the demand slope b is replaced by b
2.I n
other words, if the equilibrium solutions are p(A,ϕ,x,b), q(A,ϕ,x,b) and π(A,ϕ,x,b) under autarky, then
after trade liberalization the solutions will be pt = p(A,ϕ,x, b
2), qt = q(A,ϕ,x, b
2) and πt = π(A,ϕ,x, b
2).
It is straightforward to reach the following conclusion: if ya = y(b), Aa = A(b) and Ra = R(b) are












.T h i s
connection between the equilibria before and after trade liberalization proves very convenient in studying
the impact of trade liberalization.
These two approaches are not only mathematically equivalent, but also economically isomorphic. With-
out any trade cost, a ﬁrm views the two product markets (domestic and export) as identical. At the same
time, a consumer is assumed not to treat domestic varieties differently from imported varieties. Compared
to autarky, therefore, a ﬁrm’s demand under trade liberalization is doubled (population increases from L
to 2L), which is captured by the change of the slope from b to b
2 (because b =
γ
L). From the ﬁrm’s point
of view, for given A and R, the change in the slope of the demand curve is the only difference between
15ϕ
capital scale product scope output
ϕ ϕ
Figure 1: Impacts of Trade Liberalization
autarky and liberalized trade, so its optimal scale and scope are doubled after trade. Of course, A, R and
consequently y will be different from those in autarky.
3.2 Equilibrium comparison
A proof Appendix I shows that yt <y a. The following proposition summarizes the effects of trade liberal-
ization.
Proposition 3. After trade liberalization, the following changes happen:
(1) Product market: the demand in each country drops: At ∈ (Aa
2 ,A a);




(3) Firm structure: low efﬁciency ﬁrms reduce scope and scale, while high efﬁciency ﬁrms expand scope
and/or scale;
(4) Aggregate scope: the total number of varieties consumed in each country increases: 2Mt >M a;
(5) Outputs: low efﬁciency ﬁrms reduce plant and ﬁrm outputs, while high efﬁciency ﬁrms increase these
outputs; industry output increases.
Proof. See Appendix I.
Some of the changes are illustrated in Figure 1, where the solid lines represent autarky and the dotted
lines represent the situation after liberalization. After trade liberalization, there is more competition in the
product market. More products are sold in each country, so the demand for each variety, represented by A,
drops. Later it will be shown that the capital price R may rise or drop. In either case, due to the increased
16competition, the product market in each country becomes less proﬁtable relative to the capital price, i.e., y
drops.
Plant capital scale is affected by trade liberalization through two effects. First, because product markets
become less proﬁtable relative to capital prices, each plant will reduce its scale (recall that scale increases
with y). Second, because each variety is sold in both countries, plant scale will be doubled. Low efﬁciency
ﬁrms have small scales; doubling the scale will not add much. So theﬁrst effect dominates for low efﬁciency
ﬁrms, and they reduce their scales after trade liberalization. Firms with very low efﬁciency will sell their
capital and exit. For high efﬁciency ﬁrms, the second effect dominates, so they expand their scale. Depend-
ing on the parameters, it is possible that all ﬁrms reduce scale, but if a ﬁrm expands its scale, all ﬁrms with
higher efﬁciency will also expand their scale.
Product scope is proportional to each plant’s proﬁt, and it is affected by trade liberalization in the same
way as scale. Because the product market becomes more competitive, the proﬁt will drop. Because each
variety is sold in both countries, the proﬁt will double. Again, the ﬁrst effect dominates for low efﬁciency
ﬁrms, so they reduce scope; the second effect dominates for high efﬁciency ﬁrms, so they expand scope. It
is possible that all ﬁrms reduce scope, but if a ﬁrm expands its scope, all ﬁrms with higher efﬁciency will
also expand their scope.
Now consider the redistribution of capital. Low efﬁciency ﬁrms reduce both scale and scope, so they
must sell capital; the least efﬁcient ﬁrms sell all of their capital and exit. High efﬁciency ﬁrms, by contrast,
expand scale and/or scope, and they buy capital. It is possible that all ﬁrms reduce scale, or all ﬁrms reduce
scope,14 but not both at the same time. Otherwise all ﬁrms would sell capital, which cannot happen at
equilibrium.
The effect of trade liberalization on the aggregate scope (i.e., the total number of varieties) produced
in each country is unclear, as low efﬁciency ﬁrms reduce scope while high efﬁciency ﬁrms may or may
not expand it. Nevertheless, the aggregate scope consumed in each country, produced by both countries, is
higher after trade liberalization. The effect on outputs is not surprising: low efﬁciency ﬁrms reduce plant
and ﬁrm outputs, while high efﬁciency ﬁrms increase these outputs even when they reduce scale or scope.
Total industry output increases.
The overall picture is clear: trade liberalization brings both exporting opportunities and intensiﬁed com-
petition. Facing the same opportunities and challenges, different ﬁrms respond differently. High efﬁciency
ﬁrms are more capable of turning inputs into outputs, but in autarky they are constrained by the limited
demand in the product market. Trade liberalization enlarges the markets for their products, and they take
the opportunity to expand. Low efﬁciency ﬁrms, by contrast, have limited ability to take advantage of the
exporting opportunity and are affected mainly by the increased competition. Different product/factor trade-
offs lead to different choices: low efﬁciency ﬁrms reduce scale, scope, outputs and even exit, while high
efﬁciency ﬁrms do the opposite. Capital moves from low to high efﬁciency ﬁrms.
A prediction of many previous multiproduct models has been that all ﬁrms reduce product scope after
14When
β
L is larger or
γ2m
L2α2 is smaller, the cutoff point of ϕ for scale moves to the left (i.e., more ﬁrms increase scale) while the
cutoff point of ϕ for scope moves to the right (i.e., fewer ﬁrms expand scope).
17trade liberalization (Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2009; Eckel and Neary, 2009; Mayer, Melitz and Otta-
viano, 2009). The conclusion of this analysis is different: high efﬁciency ﬁrms may expand their scope.
Previous models considered products as heterogeneous within a ﬁrm, and the impact of trade liberalization
worked through either the factor market or the product market, but not both. The export opportunity bids
up labor price or raises product market competition, forcing each ﬁrm to drop its marginal products, just as
trade liberalization forces marginal ﬁrms to exit in single product models. This study assumes products are
homogeneous within a ﬁrm and the optimal scope is proportional to each plant’s proﬁt. Trade liberalization
changes a ﬁrm’s product/factor tradeoff differently depending on the ﬁrm’s efﬁciency, leading to different
responses in terms of scope. Efﬁcient ﬁrms can make better use of exporting opportunities. Their proﬁts
may increase, leading to scope expansion. This points to the possibility that high efﬁciency ﬁrms may ex-
pand their scope after trade liberalization. Furthermore, they are more likely to do so when products are less
valuable (small α)o rm o r ed i f f e r e n t i a t e d( s m a l lβ), the market size is small (small L), or managing varieties
is more costly (large m). It is therefore an empirical question as to whether or not high efﬁciency ﬁrms
expand their scope after trade liberalization and, if so, under what conditions.
A major purpose of studying heterogeneous ﬁrms is to investigate how trade liberalization changes
industry productivity. We have deﬁned three measures of productivity.
Proposition 4. After trade liberalization,
(1) Total factor productivity improves: ωt >ω a;






















































Proof. See Appendix I.
TFP is ﬁxed at
√
ϕ at both the plant and ﬁrm level, and therefore does not change after trade liberal-
ization. However, because capital, labor and output redistribute to more efﬁcient ﬁrms, the industry’s TFP
improves.
Labor productivity at the plant and ﬁrm level is inversely related to the capital price—trade liberalization
improves labor productivity if and only if capital becomes cheaper. This inverse relationship is easy to
understand. When capital is cheaper, ﬁrms will substitute capital for labor, so for the same output, the labor
input will decrease, improving labor productivity. Note that the proportional change in labor productivity is
the same for all ﬁrms. This is because, in this two-stage game, all ﬁrms choose the optimal combinations
of labor and capital. Because they face the same wage rate and capital price, the combination is the same
for all ﬁrms. On the industry level, because labor moves to more efﬁcient ﬁrms, the improvement of labor
productivity is greater than at the individual ﬁrm level.
Overall productivity at the plant, ﬁrm and industry levels are all inversely related to the capital price.
That is simply because capital is part of the cost, so more expensive capital affects overall productivity
inversely. Atthe plantlevel, the proportionalchange in overall productivity dependsonly ontheproportional
change in the capital price and is therefore the same for all ﬁrms. The improvement in ﬁrm productivity is












a), indicating rationalization within ﬁrms. Because the two
measures of overall productivity differ only in the management cost, the rationalization indicates that trade
liberalization is conducive to the management of multiple products. Furthermore, the rationalization is






a increases with ϕ). If overall productivity improves for ﬁrm ϕ0,t h e ni t
also improves for all ﬁrms with ϕ>ϕ 0. The improvement in overall industry productivity is also greater
than that at the plant level.
The three measurements, TFP best captures the redistribution of resources amongﬁrms, labor productiv-
ity reﬂects substitution between labor and capital, and overall productivity captures the joint effectiveness of
managing varieties and the production of each variety. In the latter two cases, although all the measures de-
pend on the capital price, which may rise or drop, rationalization is still evident in comparisons between the
measures. Therefore, the general picture is that trade liberalization induces more efﬁcient use of resources.
The two inputs, labor is supplied perfectly elastically, so the wage rate is ﬁxed. Capital supply, however,
is perfectly inelastic and the capital price is endogenized. So, we have seen, the effect of trade liberalization
depends crucially on changes in the capital price, which may increase or decrease after trade liberalization.
Proposition 5. Capital price increases when
β
L is small, and decreases when
β
L is large while
γ2m
L2α2 is small.
Proof. See Appendix I.
Whether or not the capital price increases depends crucially on product substitutability represented by
β. Recall that the demand for each variety in autarky is pi = A−bqi,w h e r eA =
αγ+βP
βM+γ and b =
γ
L.T r a d e
liberalization brings two changes to product demand: A drops, meaning that competition in the product
market is intensiﬁed; and b is halved, meaning that the market size for each product is doubled. If β is very
small, for example, imagine β =0(each variety is a monopoly), then A = α, and trade liberalization will
not reduce A. In that case, every ﬁrm produces for a larger market with no more competition. The extra
production raises demand for capital, which bids up the capital price. Conversely, when β is large, products
are close substitutes. Because competition between products is strong, trade liberalization will intensify
competition greatly, leading to a much smaller A. This may dominate the double-market-size effect and
lead many ﬁrms to sell capital, in which case the aggregate demand for capital drops and the capital price
declines. Note that for the capital price to drop, in addition to a large β, another condition is a small
γ2m
L2α2,
which implies that y must be small both before and after trade liberalization.15 That is, capital must be
scarce in the general economy.
In this model, the only use of capital is for production, so the capital price relative to the value of the
product produced can be a measure of capital scarcity. On that measure, the effect of trade liberalization is
unambiguous: capital becomes more expensive relative to the demand in the product market as y ≡ A √
2R
decreases.
15Recall that ya is solved from equation (12) and yt is solved from the same equation with b being replaced with
b
2. In both
cases, y is increasing in
γ2m
L2α2.
19The ﬁnding that factor prices may drop in response to trade liberalization is a surprise. In all previous
studies in which factor price was not ﬁxed (Melitz, 2003; Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2009), trade liber-
alization was invariably found to raise factor prices. There are two reasons for the difference. Melitz (2003)
derived demand from CES preference and thus had a constant and exogenous markup, and there was free
entry (i.e., repeated drawing of efﬁciencies) so that any disturbance to the market demand was exactly offset
by entry. In this analysis, by contrast, demand is linear, and there is no free entry to restore A, the aggregate
variable representing the degree of market competition. Note that even when the capital price drops, the
least efﬁcient ﬁrms still exit, which was impossible in previous formulations.




L is large while
γ2m
L2α2 is small, labor productivity and overall productivity improve at all levels,
plant, ﬁrm and industry.
(2) When
β
L is small, labor productivity drops at the plant and ﬁrm levels, but may rise at the industry
level. Overall productivity drops at the plant level, but may rise at the ﬁrm and industry levels.
As has been discussed, trade liberalization always improves industry TFP, as resources move from low
to higher efﬁciency ﬁrms. Other measurements depend on the capital price. The corollary says that when the
capital price declines, all efﬁciency measures improve, indicating a more efﬁcient distribution of resources
both across and within ﬁrms. Even when the capital price increases, rationalization is evident in the fact that
the improvement at the ﬁrm and industry levels is greater than the improvement at the plant level.
4 Concluding Remarks
This study looked at heterogeneous ﬁrms and the tradeoff between products and resources. Both product
a n df a c t o rm a r k e t sa r ea tw o r ki ns h a p i n gﬁrms’ choices. Consistent with prior work in this area, we have
shown that trade liberalization improves industry productivity by redistributing resources toward more ef-
ﬁcient ﬁrms. However, the joint consideration of product and factor markets produces new results. Factor
prices may drop as a result of trade liberalization, which is impossible if the two markets are considered sep-
arately. Although all ﬁrms face the same changes in the product and factor markets, they respond differently
depending on their efﬁciencies. While capital is homogenous and affects ﬁrms uniformly (i.e., the cost of
acquiring capital is the same for all ﬁrms), the product market affects more efﬁcient ﬁr m sm o r eh e a v i l yt h a n
it affects less efﬁcient ﬁrms.
Most prior work has assumed a single production factor such as labor, and hence has focused on labor
productivity.16 Firms in our model use two inputs, and the analysis demonstrates that labor productivity
16An exception is the work of Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007), who investigated the impact of trade liberalization in a
general equilibrium framework with different relative factor abundance across countries. But they used CES demand functions and
therefore trade liberalization affected ﬁrms’ choices only through the factor markets.
20depends crucially on the substitution between labor and capital. This represents a new channel through
which productivity can be affected by trade liberalization. Furthermore, we have demonstrated that the
substitution between factors depends on the relative factor prices, which in turn depends on the degree of
product substitution in consumers’ demand function.
The bilateral trade liberalization considered here brings exporting opportunities and intensiﬁed compe-
tition. To further demonstrate how the tradeoff between product and factor markets shapes ﬁrms’ choices,
we study in Appendix II a different scenario in which ﬁrms face intensiﬁed competition without enjoying
the beneﬁt of exporting. This will be the case if trade liberalization is unilateral, i.e. a country imports the
industry’s products but cannot export them. Then the direct effect disappears; trade liberalization affects the
acquisition market only indirectly through the product market. Because imports reduce the demand for each
domestic product, the aggregate demand for capital drops unambiguously, reducing the capital price. In fact,
we show that the capital price must drop more than the demand does so that the product actually becomes
more proﬁtable relative to the capital price. All plants expand scale, but the change in product scope is again
non-uniform. High efﬁciency ﬁrms are affected mainly by changes in the product market, so they reduce
scope and sell capital. Low efﬁciency ﬁrms are affected mainly by changes in the acquisition market, so
they increase scope and buy capital.
To allow the product market to affect ﬁrms’ choices, we have followed Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
in assuming a linear demand function. An alternative is the CES demands assumed by Melitz (2003) and
most subsequent studies.17 A CES demand has the peculiar feature of exogenous and constant markups that
are independent of costs, demands or market sizes. This is not only unrealistic (Helpman, 2006), but also
leads to the special property that ﬁrm choices depend only on the ratio between demand and the factor price,
leading to uniform impacts of trade liberalization even when product and factor markets are both considered.
With linear demand, ﬁrms’ choices will depend on both demand and the factor price rather than the ratio
between the two. Trade liberalization causes non-uniform responses from ﬁrms because only the product
market impact depends on a ﬁrm’s efﬁciency. Admittedly, a linear demand function is highly speciﬁc, but a
CES function is equally so. Our model demonstrates that some of the ﬁne details of the implications drawn
from previous models based on CES functions will not survive under alternative forms of demand.
We have assumed that production requires two inputs, labor and capital, which are treated asymmetri-
cally: Labor is supplied perfectly elastically at a ﬁxed wage rate, while capital is supplied perfectly inelas-
tically at a price that is determined endogenously. Our qualitative results will not change if the wage rate is
also endogenized, or if the supply of capital is elastic, as long as capital price is endogenous.
Since two inputs are used, it seems that rationalization between the two inputs may provide another
channel for trade liberalization to improve productivity. However, this turns out not to be the case in this
formulation. The substitution between the two inputs in the production function is assumed to be the same
for all ﬁrms. Given the optimal choice of capital and labor in the two-stage game and the same wage rate and
capital price faced by all ﬁrms, the labor/capital ratio is uniform across ﬁrms. In fact, a composite input (at
the optimal labor/capital ratio) can be used in place of the two inputs to generate the same results. Although
17CES preference has also been used by Bernard, Redding and Schott (2009) and Feenstra and Ma (2008), while the linear
demand was used by Baldwin and Gu (2005), Eckel and Neary (2009), and Nocke and Yeaple (2006).
21trade liberalization changes the capital price and thus the labor/capital ratio, the same ratio applies to all
ﬁrms, so there is no rationalization between labor and capital. Nevertheless, such a rationalization will be
possible if ﬁrms differ in the labor/capital substitutability of their production functions. This is a reﬁnement
worth further investigation.
We have assumed away the possibility of cross-border capital movement. When the two countries are
symmetric, relaxing this assumption will not change any result for bilateral trade liberalization, as the capital
price will be the same in any case. If the countries are asymmetric, or if trade liberalization is unilateral,
cross-border M&A will allow an extra channel through which resources are rationalized. Such a setting will
be particularly suitable for investigating trade liberalization between countries that are asymmetric in size,
preferences, or labor/capital endowments, and represents a second direction for future work.
Appendix I: Proofs
Proof of the existence and uniqueness of R for given A
Since R = A2
2y2,w eh a v eK = A2
16b2mξ(y),w h e r eξ(y)=
ρ(y)










When R = A2
2 ,w eh a v ey =1 , ξ =0and so K =0 .W h e nR is sufﬁciently close to zero, y is large, which
means ξ can be large enough that K>1. Thus, given A, there exists a unique equilibrium capital price, R,
satisfying K(R)=1 .
Q.E.D.
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α2 =0 . Obviously,
Zt(y) >Z a(y).T h e nZt(ya) >Z a(ya)=0=Zt(yt). Because Z0
t(·) > 0,w eh a v eya >y t.
To compare a particular variable before and after trade liberalization, express the variable as a function
of y independent of b. To do so, make use of the relations R = 8b2m






(which does not contain






ρ (which is linear in b). A comparison is possible because the expression of a
particular variable differs between the two cases only in the value of b. With an expression independent of









.Itiss traightforw a rdtov erifythat
η
yρ decreasesiny. Therefore, At = A(yt) <A (ya)=




ρ,s oAa = A(b,ya) while At = A(b
2,y t)=
A(b,yt)
2 .T h e n
2At = A(b,yt). Because
y √
ρ decreases in y,w eh a v e2At >A a.
22(2) Capital redistribution:
Since yt <y a,w eh a v eϕ0
t >ϕ 0
a. Therefore, for ϕ ∈ [ϕ0
a,ϕ 0
t], xava > 0 while xtvt =0 , i.e., these
ﬁrms sell capital.











3. The left hand
side of this inequality is increasing in ϕ because yt <y a, while the right hand side is independent of ϕ.
Therefore, if the inequality holds for ϕ0, it also holds for all ϕ>ϕ 0. Because some ﬁrms (at least those
who exit) sell capital, there must be some ﬁrms who buy capital. Thus, the threshold of ϕ must be strictly
smaller than 1.
(3) Firm structure:









2Rt. Thus, a ﬁrm expands scope if and only if its ϕ
exceeds some threshold.
Scale: xt(ϕ) >x a(ϕ) i fa n do n l yi f(2yt −ya)
√
ϕ>1.I f2yt <y a,a l lﬁrms reduce scale. If 2yt >y a,
a plant expands scale if and only if its ϕ exceeds some threshold.
Note that the thresholds for x, v and xv are in general different, and that the thresholds for x and v may
be 1, i.e., all plants reduce scale, or all ﬁrms reduce scope, but the two will not happen at the same time, as




ρ ,s oMa = M(b,ya) and Mt = M(b




dy < 0 and yt <y a,w eh a v e2Mt >M a.
(5) Outputs:


















.T h e nqt >q a ifandonlyif
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y < 0,a n dyt <y a,w eh a v e 1 √ρt > 1 √ρa and
yt √ρt >
ya √ρa.T h e nqt >q a
if and only if ϕ exceeds some threshold. Because ﬁrms with ϕ ∈ [ϕ0
a,ϕ 0
t] exit and therefore reduce their
outputs, the threshold is greater than ϕ0
t (i.e., the least efﬁcient ﬁrms that survive must reduce plant-level








y < 0,w eh a v e
qt >q a for ϕ =1 ,i . e . ,t h em o s te f ﬁcient ﬁrm must increase plant-level output.
















Lη.T h e n ,i fqtvt >q ava for ϕ0,i tm u s tb et r u e
for all ϕ>ϕ 0.S oﬁrm-level output increases if and only if ϕ exceeds some threshold. The least efﬁcient









Lη decreases with y for any positive value of
β
L. Thus, ﬁrm-level output increases for the
most efﬁcient ﬁrm.










η increases with y, industry output increases.
Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4





, which decreases with y. Because yt <y a,w eh a v eωt >ω a.
(2) Labor productivity:























































































































a increases with ϕ.
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ρ increases with y when
β
L is
small, but decreases with y when
β
L is sufﬁciently large and y is small, which happens when
γ2m
L2α2 is small.
Here is a numerical example: When α = β = γ = L = m =1 , Ra =0 .0019 and Rt =0 .0079 >R a.
When α =2 0 , β =1 0 0 , and other parameters remain the same, Ra =0 .034 and Rt =0 .032 <R a.
Q.E.D.
Appendix II: Unilateral Opening-up
Trade liberalization brings both opportunities and challenges for ﬁrms. This analysis has shown that
high efﬁciency ﬁrms can make better use of exporting opportunities while low efﬁciency ﬁrms are affected
mainly by the challenges of increased competition from imports. To better understand how ﬁrm respond
differently depending on their efﬁciencies, consider unilateral trade liberalization: a country opens up to
imports but cannot export to the other country. The one-way trading involves only differentiated products.
To balance the trade, the numeraire good is assumed to be traded both ways. We focus on the importing
country, which is also referred to as the home country, while the exporting country is referred to as the
foreign country.
Firm structure
















for i = h,f,e.
Home ﬁrms face the same optimization problem as in autarky for any given Ah and Rh. Hence, the
expressions of xh and vh can be obtained by replacing A, R and y with Ah, Rh and yh in (5) and (6).
24In the foreign country, each ﬁrm can sell its products in both the domestic and export markets. Suppose
that a foreign ﬁrm sells qf of a particular variety in its domestic market and qe of the same variety in the
export market. These quantities solve the following optimization problem:
max
qf≥0,q e≥0




The interior solution (i.e., when the non-negative constraints are not binding) is
qf =
(2ϕbxf +1 ) Af − Ah
4b(ϕbxf +1 )
and qe =
(2ϕbxf +1 ) Ah − Af
4b(ϕbxf +1 )
. (19)
Af and Ah are endogenous, and it can be shown that Af >A h at equilibrium. Hence qf is always positive,






.T h a ti s ,aﬁrm exports if and only if its efﬁciency is
sufﬁciently high. Thus, even without any (ﬁxed or variable) trade costs, ﬁrms with low efﬁciency sell only
to their domestic market without exporting.18






, and the sales in the two











f)+( Ah − Af)2
8b(ϕbxf +1 )
.






,t h e nqe =0 .T h eﬁrm makes its choices as if there were no exporting opportunity,












Each plant’s proﬁt net of capital cost is ˜ πf = πf−xfRf,w h e r eπf is given above depending on whether
18The intuition is the following. For a ﬁrm in the foreign country, the domestic demand (in the foreign country) is higher than
the export demand (in the home country): Af >A h. The marginal beneﬁt of selling to the domestic market is therefore higher
than that of exporting if the sales in the two countries are the same. When ϕ (and consequently ϕxf) is low, output is small. The
marginal beneﬁt of selling the last unit in the domestic market is still higher than the marginal beneﬁt of selling the ﬁrst unit in
the export market, so the product is not exported. When ϕ is larger, output is larger. After selling some quantity in the domestic
market, the marginal beneﬁt of selling a further unit falls below the marginal beneﬁto fs e l l i n gt h eﬁrst unit in the export market,
and the ﬁrm starts to export.






.T h eﬁrm chooses xf to maximize ˜ πf, which yields
xf =
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e because Af >A h.
Given this optimal scale, a ﬁrm chooses its scope, vf, to maximize its proﬁt vf˜ πf − mv2
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4ϕbm , if ϕ>ϕ 0
e.









































ﬁrm’s labor productivity is
q
ϕ
2Rf for ϕ>ϕ 0
f. Thus, exporters are more efﬁcient in production, produce
more and earn more than ﬁrms that produce only for the domestic market, conﬁrming well-established
empirical ﬁndings.
Industry equilibrium
In the home country, the acquisition market equilibrium is derived for given Ah in exactly the same way
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26In the foreign country, the total capital demanded is Kf ≡
Z 1
0
xfvfdϕ, and from Kf =1we obtain
Rf =
8b2m
ρf + ρe +2 ˆ ρ
, (22)









vfdϕ.U s i n gxf from (20) and the fact that Ah
Af =
ye
yf , the individual product price sold in









for ϕ ∈ (ϕ0














Having expressed Rh and Rf as functions of yf, ye and yh (from (21) and (22)), we have ﬁve unknowns,
Af, Ah, yf, ye and yh,a n dﬁve equations, (23), (24) and the deﬁnitions of yf, ye and yh (from (18)), which
jointly determine the equilibrium.
Equilibrium comparison








. The equilibrium yh is solved from A2
h − 2y2











hRh > 0.S i n c eZ(ya)=0and Z0(·) > 0,w eh a v eyh >y a.
R(y)=8b2m









ρ decreases in y,w eh a v eAh <A a.
The comparison of all the other variables is easy, as the only difference between autarky and unilateral
opening-up is that home ﬁrms in the latter case face competition from imports, reﬂected in different expres-






in autarky but not after opening-up. All other expressions as functions of y are
the same. Many proofs can thus be borrowed from the trade liberalization case except that y increases in
unilateral opening-up but decreases in trade liberalization, leading to opposite conclusions. Care is needed






, which is not applicable in unilateral opening-up.
Unlike in the trade liberalization case, we do not need to worry about b.











3. The left hand side of the inequality
is decreasing in ϕ because yh >y a, so if the inequality holds for ϕ0, it also holds for all ϕ<ϕ 0.T h a ti s ,














Rh, i.e., if and only if its ϕ is below some threshold. It is possible that all ﬁrms reduce scope.






dy < 0,s oMh <M a.
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2, which decreases with y,
so industry output decreases.





, which decreases with y,s oωh <ω a.
Labor productivity at the plant and ﬁrm level: λϕ =
q
ϕ
2R, which increases after opening up as R drops.







ρ, which increases with y, so industry labor productivity
improves.
Overall productivity: μp =
q
ϕ























θ , which increases with y,s oμ
increases.
These comparisons can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 6. After unilateral opening-up, the importing country undergoes the following changes:
(1) Markets: the product market becomes more competitive (Ah <A a); the capital price drops (Rh <
Ra).
(2) Capital redistribution: capital moves from higher to lower efﬁciency ﬁrms.
(3) Firm structure: all plants expand scale; less efﬁcient ﬁrms expand their scope while higher efﬁciency
ﬁrms may reduce scope.
(4) Aggregate scope: the total number of varieties produced by home ﬁrms decreases (Mh <M a).
(5) Outputs: plant and ﬁrm outputs increase for low efﬁciency ﬁrms and decrease for high efﬁciency
ﬁrms. Industry output decreases.
(6) Productivity: total factor productivity decreases; labor and overall productivity increase on the
plant, ﬁrm and industry levels.
Some of the changes are illustrated in Figure 2, where the solid lines represent autarky and the dotted
lines represent the situation after opening-up.
Discussion
After unilateral opening up, foreign products enter the home market, so the demand for each variety
drops (A is lower). Since home capital can only be used for home production, there will be less demand for
capital, so capital becomes cheaper (R drops). In fact, the drop in R must be greater than the drop in A so
that product market becomes more proﬁtable relative to the capital price (y must rise), otherwise all ﬁrms
would reduce both scale and scope, which cannot happen at equilibrium.
Because the product market becomes more proﬁtable relative to the capital price, every plant expands
scale. For product scope, recall that high efﬁciency ﬁrms are mainly affected by changes in the product
market while low efﬁciency ﬁrms are affected mainly by changes in the acquisition market (see expression
28ϕ
Capital scale Product scope output
ϕ ϕ
Figure 2: Impacts of Unilateral Trade Liberalization
(7)). After opening up, the product market is more competitive, which tends to reduce scope, while capital
becomes cheaper, which tends to expand scope. As a result, high efﬁciency ﬁrms reduce scope while low
efﬁciency ﬁrms expand it. In the end, capital redistributes toward less efﬁcient ﬁrms. So does output. Firms
are distributed more evenly in the industry in terms of capitalization and output.
Because capital becomes cheaper, all ﬁrms substitute capital for labor, raising labor productivity at
the plant, ﬁrm and industry levels. Overall productivity, which is inversely related to average cost, also
increases. Because inputs and outputs move from high to low efﬁciency ﬁrms, the total factor productivity
of the industry drops. This last conclusion depends on the no free entry assumption, and no cross-border
trading of capital even though capital is cheaper in the importing country than in the exporting country.
For the exporting country, analytical comparisons are intractable,19 but numerical calculations conﬁrm
the intuition that almost every change is the opposite of what happens in the home country. Capital becomes
more expensive. The least efﬁcient ﬁrms exit. High efﬁciency ﬁrms buy capital and increase their scope
while low efﬁciency ﬁrms sell capital and reduce scope, leading to a more skewed distribution of ﬁrm size
measured by capital or output. Every ﬁrm reduces scale.
In both trade liberalization and unilateral opening-up, we have demonstrated that high and low efﬁciency
ﬁrms respond differently in their choices of ﬁrms structure, even though they all face the same change in
the product and factor markets. In the unilateral opening-up case, the mechanism is simple, because all
changes in the importing country are induced by a negative demand shock in the product market.20 And
19In the home country, although there are no closed-form solutions, analytical comparisons are possible because the expressions
for scale and scope are exactly the same as in the closed economy, and we can prove that yh >y a because (23) and (11) differ
only by an extra term. In the foreign country, by contrast, the expressions for scale and scope are different from those in the closed
economy, and the expressions contain yf and ye that cannot be easily compared with ya.
20Given A and R, all expressions are the same as in autarky, and the aggregate demand for capital will also be the same, leading
29the major conclusion is that high efﬁciency ﬁrms are affected mainly by changes in the product market,
while low efﬁciency ﬁrms are affected mainly by changes in the acquisition market. With bilateral trade
liberalization, there is an extra effect, because ﬁrms not only face increased competition but also enjoy
increased exporting opportunities.21 The major conclusion is that high efﬁciency ﬁrms are better able to
make use of the exporting opportunities, while low efﬁciency ﬁrms are less able to do so.
Unilateral opening-up is a rather hypothetical setting. Real life tends to have general equilibrium effects
with free entry, while this analysis is of partial equilibrium without entry. In the model, the product market
in the importing country undergoes a negative demand shock, which induces a negative demand shock in
the acquisition market. We can imagine the opposite, such as a positive taste shock that raises A,w h i c hi n
turn will induce a positive shock in the acquisition market. The foregoing discussion predicts that all of the
conclusions will be reversed.
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